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THE DELAYS OF THE LAW
The chief reason why the State devotes so much time and effort
to the administration of justice is to promote the cause of peace
and tranquility in the community. Speaking theoretically and
ideally of course, our aim is to secure equal and exact justice;
but practically, the object sought is peace.
The most recent instance of this was set forth most succinctly
and forcibly in the able report of Governor Montague as to the
progress in the establishment of a permanent tribunal at The
Hague to settle international difficulties. While in theory this is
to secure exact justice between the nations, practically its purpose
is to avoid war.
In a republic like ours, under popular control, with the dual
form of government between the States and the United States,
politico-legal questions which might tend to bring on conflict
between parties and factions among the people, were, first, the
distribution of power under the federal constitution between the
national government and the State governments; second, the
division between the executive, the legislative and the judicial
branches of the government; and, third, the limitations upon gov-
ernmental action either through the national government or the
State government, in respect to the rights of individuals. Under
our fundamental compact and its subsequent construction by the
judicial branch, there was introduced a new and most effective
instrument for the promotion of the peaceable settlement of these
great governmental political controversies. The decisions in the
cases of Marbury v. Madison, and Cohen v. Virginia, which in
their personal, aspect took on the phase of a fundamental differ-
ence of opinion between two great Virginians, established the
principle in this country, which has never been departed
from, that the ultimate arbiter in respect to such great political
and legal issues was and is the Supreme Court of the United
States. It is true that this unique feature did not save us from
the greatest civil war of modern times; but no one at all familiar
with the history of the country can deny that this function of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and a similar one within the
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sphere of their jurisdiction, of the Supreme Courts of the States
ultimately to decide upon the limitations of legislative and execu-
tive power, have greatly contributed to the peace and tranquility
of our community. This peculiar power of courts with us has
carried their usefulness for the peaceful settlement of contro-
versies beyond anything attempted in other countries. Of course,
the exercise of this power must rest on the existence of a written
constitution. Without it, there would be no guide for the courts
except indefinite traditions that could hardly be made the basis
for judicial decision. The power of the courts to declare invalid
laws of the legislature we know was not adopted without very
bitter opposition; but I think the controversy was settled now so
long ago that we generally agree that it has much contributed to
the smooth working of our constitution and to the supremacy
of law and order in our community and offers great advantages
over the methods of settling a similar class of questions in other
countries.
While we may properly felicitate ourselves on this widened
function of our courts, enabling us to avoid less peaceable
methods of settling important politico-legal questions, have we
the right to say that our present administration of justice gen-
erally insures continued popular satisfaction with its results? I
think not. It may be true that down to the present time, it has
supplied a means of settling controversies beween individuals and
of bringing to punishment those who offend against the criminal
laws sufficient to prevent a general disturbance of the peace and
to keep the dissatisfied from violent manifestation against the
government and our present social system.
There are, however, abundant evidences that the prosecution
of criminals has not been certain and thorough to the point of pre-
venting popular protest. The existence of lynching in many
parts of the country is directly traceable to this lack of uni-
formity and thoroughness in the enforcement of our criminal
laws. This is a defect which must be remedied or it will ulti-
mately destroy the republic.
I shall not delay you this morning, however, with a discussion
as to the reforms which ought to be adopted in the criminal
branch of our jurisprudence. I have attempted this in an address
on another occasion. I wish to confine myself to the delays and
inequalities in the administration of justice in controversies
between private persons, including, of course, corporations.
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The present is a time when all our institutions are being sub-
jected to close scrutiny with a view to the determination whether
we have not now tried the institutions upon which modern society
rests to the point of proving that some of them should be radically
changed. The chief attack is on the institution of private prop-
erty and is based upon the inequalities in the distribution of
wealth and of human happiness that are apparent in our present
system. As I have had occasion in other places to say frequently, I
believe that, among human institutions, that of private property,
next to personal liberty, has had most to do with the uplifting and
the physical and moral improvement of the whole human race,
but that it is not inconsistent with the rights of private property
to impose limitations upon its uses for unlawful purposes, and
that this is the remedy for reform rather than the abolition of
the institution itself. But this scrutiny of our institutions, this
increasing disposition to try experiments, to see whether there
is not some method by which human happiness may be more
equally distributed than it is, ought to make those of us who
really believe in our institutions as essential to further progress,
anxious to remove real and just grounds for criticism in our
present system.
I venture to think that one evil which has not attracted the
attention of the community at large, but which is likely to grow
in importance, as the inequality between the poor and the rich in
our civilization is studied, is in the delays in the administration
of justice between individuals. As between two wealthy cor-
porations, or two wealthy individual litigants, where the
subject matter of the litigation reaches to tens and hundreds of
thousands of dollars, where each party litigant is able to pay the
expenses of litigation, large fees to counsel and to undergo for
the time being the loss of interest on the capital involved, our
present system, while not perfect, is not so far from proper
results as to call for anxiety. The judges of the country, both
state and national, are good men. Venality in our judges is very
rare; and while the standard of judicial ability may not always
be as high as we should like to see it, the provisions for
review and for free and impartial hearing are such as gen-
erally to give just, final judgments. The inequality that exists in
our present administration of justice, and that sooner or later is
certain to rise and trouble us, and to call for popular condemna-
tion and reform, is in the unequal burden which the delays and
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expenses of litigation under our system impose on the poor
litigant. In some communities I know, delays in litigation have
induced merchants and commercial men to avoid courts alto-
gether and to settle their controversies by arbitration, and to this
extent the courts have been relieved; but such boards of arbitra-
tion are only possible as between those litigants that are members
of the same commercial body, and are in a sense associates.
They offer no relief to the litigant of little means who finds him-
self engaged in a controversy with a wealthy opponent, whether
individual or corporation.
The reform, if it is to come, must be reached through the
improvement in our judicial procedure. In the first place, the
codes of procedure are generally much too elaborate. It is pos-
sible to have a code of procedure simple and effective. This is
shown by the present procedure in the English courts, most of
which is framed by rules of court. The code of the State of New
York is staggering in the number of its sections. A similar
defect exists in some civil law countries. The elaborate Spanish
code of procedure that we found in the Philippines when we first
went there could be used by a dilatory defendant to keep the
plaintiff stamping in the vestibule of justice until time had made
justice impossible. Every additional technicality, every additional
rule of procedure adds to the expense of litigation. It is
inevitable that with an elaborate code, the expense of a suit
involving a small sum is in proportion far greater than that
involving a large sum. Hence it results that cost of justice
to the poor is always greater than it is to the rich, assuming that
the poor are more often interested in small cases than the rich in
large ones-a fairly reasonable assumption.
I listened with much pleasure to the discussion yesterday in
respect to the proposed amendment to your procedure in Virginia,
and I was reminded of a discussion of the same subject by that
great lawyer, Mr. James C. Carter of New York. He was the
leader of the opposition to the New York code, and had to meet
Mr. David Dudley Field, who was its chief supporter. Mr.
Carter impressed me with having in that particular discussion
the better side. He showed that under the Massachusetts pro-
cedure, which is, I fancy, not unlike yours in Virginia, to wit, a
retention of the common law forms of action, together with the
division between law and equity, with modifications to dispense
with the old technical niceties of common law and equity plead-
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ing, the decisions on questions of practice and pleading in Massa-
chusetts were not one-tenth of those arising under the code of
New York, and his argument was a fairly strong one in support
of the contention which I heard here yesterday, that it was better
to retain the old system and avoid its evils by amendment than to
attempt a complete reform. However, it is to be said that a study
of the English system consisting of a few general principles laid
down in the practice act, and supplemented by rules of court to be
adopted by the High Court of Judicature, has worked with great
benefit to the litigant, and has secured much expedition in the
settlement of controversies and has practically eliminated the
discussion of points of practice and pleading in the appellate
courts. My impression is that if the judges of the court of last
resort were charged with the responsibility within general lines
defined by the legislature for providing a system in which the
hearings on appeal should be as far as possible with respect to
the merits and not with respect to procedure, and which should
make for expedition, they are about as well qualified to do this as
anybody to whom the matter can be delegated.
This system of delegating questions of procedure to courts has
a precedent of long standing in the Supreme Court of the United
States, for under the Federal statutes that court has to frame the
rules of equity to govern procedure in equity in the Federal courts
of first instance. I may say incidentally that with deference to
that great court, it has not given particular attention to the sim-
plification of equity procedure and to the speeding of litigation
in Federal courts which might well be brought about by a radical
change in the rules of equity prescribed by it. It may be and
probably is the fact that under the constitutional provision, Con-
gress could not do away with the separation of law and equity
cases as has been done in the codes of many of the States. I
regret this because such a change makes for simplicity and
expedition in the settlement of judicial controversies. It is clear,
however, that the old equity practice could be greatly simplified.
It has been done in England, and it ought to be. done in the
Federal courts.
One reason for delay in the lower courts is the disposition of
judges to wait an undue length of time in the writing of their
opinions or judgments. I speak with confidence on this point, for
I have been one of the sinners myself. In English courts, the
ordinary practice is for the judge to deliver judgment imme-
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diately upon the close of the argument, and this is the practice
that ought to be enforced as far as possible in our courts of first
instance. It is almost of as much importance that the court of
first instance should decide promptly as that it should decide
right. If judges had to do so, they would become much more
attentive to the argument during its presentation and much more
likely on the whole to decide right when the evidence and argu-
ments are fresh in their mind. In the Philippines we have adopted
the system of refusing a judge his regular monthly stipend unless
he can file a certificate, with his receipt for his salary, in which he
certifies on honor that he has disposed of all the business submitted
to him within the previous sixty days. This has had a mar-
velously good effect in keeping the dockets of the court clear.
It may be asserted as a general proposition, to which many
legislatures seem to be oblivious, that everything which tends to
prolong or delay litigation between individuals, or between
individuals and corporations, is a great advantage for that litigant
who has the longer purse. The man whose all is involved in the
decision of the lawsuit is much prejudiced in a fight through the
courts, if his opponent is able, by reason of his means, to prolong
the litigation and keep him for years out of what really belongs to
him. The wealfhy defendant can almost always secure a com-
promise or yielding of lawful rights because of the necessities of
the poor plaintiff. Many people who give the subject hasty con-
sideration regard the system of appeals, by which a suit can be
brought in a justice of the peace court and carried through the
other courts to the Supreme Court, as the acme of human wisdom.
The question is asked: "Shall the poor man be denied the oppor-
tunity to have his case re-examined in the highest tribunal in the
land?" Generally the argument has been successful. In truth,
there is nothing which is so detrimental to the interests of the
poor man as the right which, if given to him, must be given to
the other and wealthier party, of carrying the litigation to the
court of last resort, which generally means two, three and four
years of litigation. Could any greater opportunity be put in the
hands of powerful corporations to fight off just claims, to defeat,
injure or modify the legal rights of poor litigants, than to hold
these litigants off from what is their just due by a lawsuit for
such a period, wifh all the legal expenses incident to such a con-
troversy? Every change of procedure that limits the right of
appeal works for the benefit in the end of the poor litigant and
puts him more on an equality with a wealthy opponent. It is
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probably true that the disposition of the litigation in the end is
more likely to be just when three tribunals have passed upon it
than when only one or two have settled it; but the injustice which
meantime has been done by the delay to the party originally
entitled to the judgment generally exceeds the advantage that
he has had in ultimately winning the case. Generally in every
system of courts there is a court of first instance, an intermediate
court of appeals and a court of last resort. The court of first
instance and the intermediate appellate court should be for the
purpose of finally disposing in a just and prompt way of all con-
troversies between litigants. So far as the litigant is concerned,
one appeal is all that he should be entitled to. The community
at large is not interested in his having more than one. The
function of the court of last resort should not primarily be for the
purpose of securing a second review or appeal to the particular
litigants whose case is carried to that court. It is true that the
court can only act in concrete cases between particular litigants,
and so incidentally it does furnish another view to the litigants, in
that case; but the real reason for granting the review should be
to enable the Supreme Court to lay down general principles of
law for the benefit and guidance of the community at large.
Therefore, the appellate jurisdiction of the court of last resort
should be limited to those cases which are typical and which give
to it in its judgment an opportunity to cover the whole field of
the law. This may be done by limiting the cases within its
cognizance to those involving a large sum of money, or to the
construction of the Constitution of the United States or the States
or their statutes. The great body of the litigation which it is
important to dispose of, to end the particular controversies,
should be confined to the courts of first instance and the inter-
mediate appellate courts. It is better that the cases be all decided
promptly, even if a few are wrongly decided.
In our Supreme Courts the business is disposed of with per-
haps as great promptness as is consistent with the purpose of their
jurisdiction. The criticism that courts of last resort are too much
given to technicality has, I believe, some merit in it. Codes might
be drawn, however, giving the courts of review more discretion
in this matter than they now have by requiring the party complain-
ing of an error in the trial court to show affirmatively that the
result would have been different if the error had not been com-
mitted. The difference in importance between an error in the
hurly-burly of the actual trial and in the.calm of a court of review
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under the urgent argument of counsel for plaintiff in error and the
microscopic vision of an analytical but technical mind on the
Supreme Bench is very great.
The complaints that the courts are made for the rich and not
for the poor have no foundation in fact in the attitude of the
courts upon the merits of any controversy which may come before
them, for the judges of this country are as free from prejudice
in this respect as it is possible to be. But the inevitable effect
of the delays incident to the machinery now required in the set-
tlement of controversies in judicial tribunals is to oppress and
put at a disadvantage the poor litigant and give great advantage
to his wealthy opponent. I do not mean to say that it is possible,
humanly speaking, to put them on an exact equality in regard to
litigation; but it is certainly possible to reduce greatly the disad-
vantage under which the man of little means labors in vindicat-
ing or defending his rights in court under the existing system,
and courts and legislatures could devote themselves to no higher
purpose than the elimination from the present system of those of
its provisions which tend to prolong the time in which judicial
controversies are disposed of.
The shortening of the time will reduce the expense, because,
first, the fees of the lawyers must be less if the time taken is not
so great. Second, the incidental court fees and costs would be
less.
Again, I believe that a great reform might be effected, cer-
tainly in the Federal courts, and I think too in the State courts,
by a mandatory reduction of the court costs and fees. In the
interest of public economy we have generally adopted a fee system
by which the officers of the courts are paid. Human nature has
operated as it might have been expected to operate, and the court
officers, the clerk and the marshal, have not failed, especially in
the Federal courts, to make the litigation as expensive as possible,
with a view to making certain the earning of a sufficient amount
to pay their salaries. The compensation of the officers of the
court and the fees charged ought to be entirely separate consider-
ations. The losses which the Government may have to suffer
through the lack of energy in the collection of costs and fees
should be remedied in some other way. The salaries of the court
officers should be fixed and should be paid out of the treasury
of the county, state or national government, as the case may be,
and fees should be reduced to as low a figure as possible con-
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sistent with a reasonable discouragement of groundless and
unnecessary litigation. I believe it is sufficiently in the interest of
the public at large to promote equality between litigants, to take
upon the government much more than has already been done, the
burden of private litigation. What I have said has peculiar
application to the Federal courts. The feeling with respect to
their jurisdiction has been that limited as it is now to cases
involving not less than $2,ooo, the litigation must of course be
between men better able to undergo its expense than in causes
involving a less amount, and therefore that high fees and costs
are not so objectionable in those courts as in the State courts. I
think this has been a very unfortunate view and has been one
of the several grounds for creating the prejudice that has
undoubtedly existed in popular estimation against the Federal
courts as rich men's courts. In those courts suits for damages for
personal injury, of which many are there by removal of defend-
ant, are generally brought by poor persons. Then the expense
of litigation in patent cases is almost prohibitive for a poor
inventor. It forces him into contracts that largely deprive him
of the benefit of his invention. In respect to patent cases much
might be done by the Supreme Courts reforming the equity pro-
cedure and the bill of costs.
I think another step in the direction of the dispatch of litiga-
tion would be the requirement of higher qualifications for those
judges who sit to hear the cases, involving a small pecuniary
amount. The system by which the justices of the peace who have
to do with smaller cases are non-professional men and not
apt in the disposition of business, is hardly a wise feature of
the present system. The poor should have the benefit of as acute
and able judges as the rich, and the money saved in the smaller
salaries of the judges of the inferior courts is not an economy in
the interest of the public. Under able, educated and well-paid
judges who understand the purpose of the law in creating them, I
am quite sure that the people's courts, as they are called, could be
made much more effective than they are for the final settlement
of controversies.
Another method by which the irritation at the inequalities in
our administration of justice may be reduced is by the intro-
duction of a system for the settling of damage suits brought by
employes against public service corporations through official
arbitration and without resort to jury trials. Such a system is
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working in England, as I am informed. Under the statute, lim-
itations aTe imposed upon the recovery of the employe or his.
representatives proportioned to his earning capacity. The hear-
ing is prompt and the payment of the award equally prompt, and
in this way a large mass of litigation that now blocks our courts.
would be taken out of our judicial tribunals, and be settled with
dispatch. Of course it would not be proper or possible to prevent
the plaintiff litigant from resorting to a jury trial if he chooses,
but I believe that the result would be very largely to reduce the
character of such litigation. The truth is that these suits for
damages for injuries to employes and passengers and to tres-
passers and licensees have grown to be such a very large part of
the litigation in each court, both in courts of first instance and in
courts of appeal, and involve so much time because of the neces-
sity for a jury trial, that they may be properly treated as a class
and special statutory provision for their settlement by arbitration
or otherwise be made. These are the cases which create most
irritation against the courts among the poor. This is peculiarly
true in such cases in the Federal courts..
No one can have sat upon the Federal bench as I did for eight
or nine years and not realize how defective the administration of
justice in these cases must have seemed to the defeated plaintiff,
whether he was the legless or armless employe himself or his
personal representative. A non-resident railway corporation had
removed the case which had been brought in the local court of
the county in which the injured employe lived, to the Federal
court, held, it may be, at a town forty or one hundred miles away.
To this place at great expense the plaintiff was obliged to carry
his witnesses. The case came on for trial, the evidence was pro-
duced and under the strict Federal rule as to contributory
negligence or as to non-liability for the negligence of fellow
servants, the judge was obliged to direct the jury to return a
verdict for the defendant. Then the plaintiff's lawyer had to
explain to him that if he had been able to to remain in the State
court, a different rule of liability of the company would have
obtained, and he would have recovered a verdict. How could a
litigant thus defeated, after incurring the heavy expenses incident
to litigation in the Federal court, with nothing to show for it,
have any other feeling than that the Federal courts were instru-
ments of injustice and not justice, and that they were organized
to defend corporations and not to help the poor to their rights? I
am glad to be able to say that under the interstate commerce
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employers' liability act much -of this occasion for bitterness
against the Federal courts and their administration of justice will
be removed, and I believe it would greatly add to the popular
confidence in the Federal courts if a Federal statute were enacted,
by which, under proper limitations, official arbitration could be
provided for settling the awards to employes in such cases arising
in the carrying on of interstate commerce. We cannot, of course,
dispense with the jury system. It is that which makes the people
a part of the administration of justice and prevents the possibility
of government oppression, but every means by which in civil cases
litigants may be induced voluntarily to avoid the expense, delay
and burden of jury trials ought to be encouraged, because in this
way the general administration of justice can be greatly facilitated
and the expense incident to delay in litigation can be greatly
reduced.
I listened with professional pride yesterday, as every lawyer
must have done, to the deserved encomiums which Senator
Lindsay paid to the members of our profession and their willing
sacrifices in every crisis in our country's history. Certainly no one
has a profounder admiration than I have for the important part
which the members of our profession must play in making a per-
manent success of self-government. I venture to suggest, how-
ever, that in respect to these details of our profession, these tech-
nicalities out of which can grow real abuses, there is sometimes a
disposition on the part of the members of our profession to treat
litigants as made for the courts and the lawyers, and not the
courts and lawyers as made for litigants. As it is, lawyers who
in judicial committees of the legislature, draft the codes of pro-
cedure, there is not as strong an impelling force as there ought to
be to make the final disposition of cases as short as possible.
There is a story among the traditions of our Ohio Bar that a
Mr. Nash, who had written a book generally used to aid prac-
titioners in Ohio before the adoption of the code of procedure in
1851, was very indignant at the enactment of that new measure,
and he severely condemned it. He said that the code was a
barbarous arrangement under which a suit could be
brought against one man, judgment taken against another
and an execution issued upon that judgment against any
good man in the State of Ohio. Now our profession
is naturally conservative. It is our natural disposition to have
things done in an orderly way and to believe that the way in
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which things have been done should not be departed from until
we clearly see an opportunity for improvement. I do not object
to this spirit. Especially in this country, I think there will be
progressive movements sufficient to prevent such conservatism
from being a real obstruction to our general progress. I venture
to think, however, that in the matter of procedure and in the
adoption of special methods and systems for the settling of classes
of controversies, we ought to be careful that this professional
conservatism does not keep us, with the power that we necessarily
exercise in respect to technical legal legislation, from adopting
the reforms which are in the interest of equalizing the adminis-
tration of justice as far as possible between the rich and the poor.
William H. Taft.
